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Wealth grows out of coordinated acts. Its lack comes out of disunity.​[1]​ 
Introduction
After the Portuguese explorations into the Indian Ocean at the very end of the 15th century, the Portuguese started to raise permanent settlements in the Indian Ocean region from the beginning of the 16th century. These settlements were meant to support a permanent fleet that could control the sea trade in the Indian Ocean and localized trade could be established.​[2]​ The plan that was developed to realize these goals had clear economic and commercial objectives, but the religious element also has to be emphasized. After initial Portuguese successes, the Dutch and the English also found their way to the Indian Ocean and established their own trading posts and trading networks. But the Europeans met severe competition, from each other but also from the local merchants because they were not willing to give up their long existing trading positions. Trade in the Indian Ocean existed long before the Europeans even discovered this region, so the Europeans were not the ones who brought ‘an age of commerce’ to the Indian Ocean region. The economy the Europeans found at their arrival was not one of self-sufficiency and with little to no trade.​[3]​ The economy the Europeans found was just as developed as their own despite the European absence. 
Europeans were long active in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The Indian Ocean was the domain of the Arabian-Indian trading networks and in the Southeast Asian waters, Chinese merchants were active. All these three regions had the knowledge and skills to sail the around the world but only Europe engaged in these activities. The Chinese empires followed policies of isolation and this prohibited exploring by land and sea. The discovery and exploitation of new and existing trading routes gave the Europeans great advantages over the other two maritime regions in this period. The commercial, military and diplomatic predominance of Europe started to take its shape from this moment on.​[4]​ With this commercial and diplomatic predominance, Europe was able to seize a central position in the ancient trading networks. Especially the Dutch were dominant in the inter-Asian trade which was in fact a unique development.​[5]​ In the Arabian seas the European influence was also noticeable but a dominant position in these trading networks was never achieved. The position of the local merchants remained stronger than the position of their Chinese counterparts in the Southeast Asian waters.​[6]​ 
	In the same period the Europeans arrived in the Indian Ocean region and started to build and started to settle their seaborne empires, on the Iranian plateau another trading network started to flourish. The Armenians conducted their trade overland and became very successful in the 17th century. From the mid-16th century onwards, the Armenians had been the main carriers in the overland trade between Central Asia and the Mediterranean. Their trading network already reached into the Levant and further into Italy, where they traded Asian products for cloth from the Levant.​[7]​ But their trading routes also stretched out into Russia and the Crimea, and from the Armenian settlements along these caravan routes, the Armenians were able to trade with more distant locations in the Mughal Empire, where they arrived and started to trade before the Europeans made their appearance.​[8]​ The Mediterranean, the Arabian Seas, Eastern Europe and the Central Asian steppes were already closely tied together, by a network of commodity-flows but also by the interconnected merchant networks of which, amongst many networks, the Armenians were the most prominent.​[9]​ 
	Both the trading networks were successful and were successful in the same period. But there is also the classic idea that the European seaborne trade caused a decline in the ancient old overland trade. The overland trading routes saw important commodities get displaced to the overseas routes, travelled by the Europeans; the international trade faced a reorientation, or a revolution. The overland trade started to decline from the moment the Portuguese started to sail more often to the Indian Ocean, but the real setback occurred with the increasing seaborne trade of the Dutch, at the beginning of the 17th century. The trading companies were able to divert the trade from the overland routes but also tried to control the markets and the supplies. The European entry into the Asian markets caused a revolution because the existing trading patterns changed dramatically.​[10]​ 
	The growing network of the Armenians proves the idea of the decline of the overland trading routes wrong. However, it is safe to say that a revolution in the trade between Europe and Asia took place; but not at the expense of the overland trade. Both overland and overseas trade witnessed a revolution because of the diverting trading routes, the increasing variety of available products and the growing demand for Middle Eastern products, like coffee in Europe after 1650.​[11]​ 
	The waters of the Indian Ocean region and the China Sea were the domain of Muslim merchants who also participated in the overland trade to and from Russia, the Ottoman Empire and India although other ethnic trading networks were active in these areas. The trading hub that connected both the Indian Ocean and the China Sea was Malacca.​[12]​ Traditionally the Asian maritime merchants are described as peddlers, so trade was not organized in corporations. Larger scale commerce started to develop however from the 15th century on and Asian merchants now became more able to compete with the European rivals, at least at a local or even regional level. The evidence for a distinctive Muslim trading network is ambiguous, and the network probably did not operate as an organization or a corporation. It is more likely that the Muslim network consisted of individuals with interrelated goals.​[13]​ Another important group of traders were the Hindus. But again, this was not an Indian world economy but several smaller ‘world’ economies that were loosely connected.​[14]​ Most of the merchants in Asia did not have any kind of support from their state. Most of the powers in these areas were land based and therefore had little interest in conduct of maritime trade. Collecting taxes and custom duties was one element of trading that the empires did pursue.​[15]​ In the Arabian Seas, until the rise of Oman, there had never been a singular power controlling large areas and the seas.​[16]​ The seas themselves were never seen as state property and so, no power had tried to dominate them, but then the Europeans arrived.​[17]​ 

 The first chapter will take a look at cross cultural and fundamental problems of exchange, since this is necessary step before the exploration of the different strategies that were available in the 17th century to tackle the cross cultural problems of exchange. Comparing different cases requires a specific methodology. This method, the so-called comparative method has been developed and elucidated by Charles Ragin.​[18]​ The second chapter will deal with this method and will explain how this method is useful for historical research even though it has been developed for social sciences. The third chapter will concentrate on the VOC and their strategies in Southeast Asia, where the VOC put everything to work to obtain the much desired spice monopolies. This chapter will be more descriptive but this description will also function as framework for the more general strategy of the use of violence in obtaining property rights. In the fourth chapter, the focus shifts to another region of the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Seas, although the main focus is not on the overseas trade but on overland trade conducted by the Armenian merchant network. This chapter also has a more descriptive character but again, this is the frame for explaining the strategy of small scale entrepreneurship within a family structure. The Boolean analysis, already explained in the second chapter will applied to the different strategies used for the cross cultural problems of exchange in chapter five. The formula for answering the main question will be composed in this chapter, so the comparison between the different strategies used by the Dutch and the Armenians can be made. In the conclusion the formula will be explained in more detail and the main question will finally be answered. 
Trading in theory
Cross cultural trade has long been an essential part of human life, but crossing cultural boundaries contains a risk. Unknown foreigners are distrusted and therefore, doing business with strangers will not spontaneously take place. This trust problem is however solved, by specific institutions that helped in arranging the necessary secure environment for doing business. The creation of trading networks is one possibility and very often used institution. Networks consist of informal connections between the different elements of the production chain of commodities. The most common way of establishing those bonds was the settlement of foreign merchants in a host society. These foreigners then got to know their way around the host culture and could serve as brokers between the host society and the merchants from their hometown, because these brokers were able to bridge the differences between both the cultures. After the initial settlement, a spread across the region into more host societies created a trading network. Networks can be organized in many different ways, but the informal bonds remain the most important characteristic.​[19]​ 
	The relations between the different settlements could vary greatly. The shared culture could provide solidarity and this solidarity could be the only link between the settlements. The Armenian trading network that flourished in the first half of the 17th century is an example. The host societies in which the Armenians had established their residences remained the dominant power, so the Armenians had to adjust themselves to the local political circumstances. At the other end of the variation in settlement is the political unit. Control of the settlement was in this case in hands of the merchants themselves and they were able to have political bonds with other settlements. The European trading companies in the Indian Ocean are examples. These companies were also networks but had a second function, because they were an extension of the state of their home country. The characteristic informal bonds became formal bonds with the establishment of political units in the Indian Ocean and this turned the European companies from a network into a corporation. A famous European trading company is the Dutch VOC and with their corporate organization, they were able to penetrate virtually the entire trading world in the Indian Ocean. The Southeast Asian waters were dominated in a violent way and the Indonesian archipelago was taken over completely. However, this strategy was not an overall success formula. The Arabian Seas proved to be a lot more difficult to penetrate, mainly because the seaborne trade in this region was not as well developed as in the southeast corner of the Indian Ocean. The trade in the Arabian region was mostly conducted overland by the Armenian trading network. But, even though this brings about higher transaction costs, the Armenian network was flourishing in the 17th century, the same period the European trading companies were flourishing in the same region. 
With the rise of the European trading companies, the cross cultural problems of exchange had found another solution but this solution was however not perfect because the European companies were not able to penetrate every corner of the Indian Ocean region. In the Southeast Asian waters, the Europeans and especially the Dutch were able to dominate the trade to Europe and also the trade within the region. In the Arabian Seas, the Dutch were incapable of obtaining the same position as the dominant trading party and the Armenian competition remained very strong. The question is what explains the success of both the networks, even though they were in essence very different. To be able to answer this question it is necessary to take a look at the strategies the Dutch used to enter the Southeast Asian region of the Indian Ocean and how these strategies were able to eliminate the already existing competitors in these waters. The next step is to examine the competition in the Arabian Seas and their strategies, which will be followed by a conclusion in which a comparison of both the Dutch strategies in Southeast Asia and the competitors’ strategy in the Arabian Seas will be made, which will also answer the question ‘overland or overseas’?
The units in the comparison are in fact completely different from each other and the comparison to be made seems to become useless, the comparison will still be made. It is not necessarily the different types –overland or overseas- that are the reason for this comparison but the similar success both the different types of trading experienced in the 17th century that is the reason behind the comparison. And by examining the strategies behind the success, it might turn out that the different type of trade is not as important as it seems to be at first sight. 
Although, it is important to keep in mind that the research conducted in this paper is based on the assumption that the successes of both the trading networks are similar. But this supposed similarity in outcome is only based on the beginning period of the European trading companies. The Armenians and the VOC differ in one very important aspect: land based versus seaborne trade. The transaction costs for overland trade are higher than for overseas trade. With the emergence of the European trading companies at sea, the Armenians faced new competition. In the beginning phase of the trading companies, it was still possible to operate in the interstices that were not yet occupied by their European rivals.​[20]​ Very soon, the pepper flow the Armenians facilitated started to dry up. Very soon, the Armenians realized the advantages of the seaborne companies and the network, traditionally terrestrial, became partially maritime in the 17th and 18th century.​[21]​ The period of transition of the Eurasian trade patterns had begun and the Armenian land based success started to fade in the light of the rising seaborne successes. Decline began in the middle decades of the 18th century. This was based on the political problems in the former Safavid Empire, but the influence of the Europeans cannot be denied. They had a new kind of power that gave them greater control in the trading relations with Asia. The era of the Asian trade network was giving way to new, more worldwide patterns with a strong influence of the European norms.​[22]​. The rise of the European joint-stock companies trading with the different parts of the Indian Ocean represented not only a new development to the principle of the law of nations but also strengthening of the capitalistic organization of international trade.​[23]​ 
	The Armenians were able to survive as long as the European seaborne trade had not fully developed but very soon the European method turned out to be the superior way. The Armenian success can therefore also be related to the developmental phase of the trading companies. This does not nullify the success formula because the formula applies to both the cases that were investigated. The use of the combination of strategies enabled the Armenians to be successful and remain successful, even in the period of the rising companies. 

The European influence is more visible in Southeast Asia than in the Middle East/Arabian Seas although even in Southeast Asia the Europeans faced severe competition. The question that arises here is why the Europeans were less capable of putting aside the Arabian merchants. What caused the fact that Europeans were better able to penetrate the Southeast Asian trading networks, compared to the Arabian Seas trading networks?  There are several reasons for these different patterns of involvement. 
	The first is the nature of the products both regions had to offer. The much sought after spices were produced in the Indonesian Archipelago only. The main objective of the expeditions to the East was the direct procurement of spices and the involvement in the inter-Asian trade was only a way to facilitate this procurement.​[24]​ But the nature of the already existing trading patterns also influenced the ease by which the Europeans were able to penetrate these patterns. The organization of the trade also plays a role in the successes and failures of the trading companies. Usually, the European companies were supported by the state in their mother country, which was something the Asian trading networks did not receive. Another factor is the presence of states in Asia. Deals with local rulers, which were enforced on the population by the companies and not the rulers, was one possible strategy the companies could use, but if the trade was conducted without any control of any ruler, the chances for deals decreased. 

The question that has to be answered first is why did the Europeans sail to the Indian Ocean region? Obtaining the spices directly, instead of via traders from the Levant was an attractive aspect of the expeditions to the Southeast Asian waters. But travelling into the unknown, trading with unknown merchants was an enormous risk. In most societies, distrust towards merchants was – and perhaps still is- very prevalent. Foreigners are even more distrusted, so this seems disastrous for foreign merchants.​[25]​ Tremendous profits were the main objective, but how could the merchants be sure that these profits could in fact be made? How could they be sure that the local merchants were willing to do business with the Europeans, and not go for the short term temptation to cheat? And this also holds the other way around; how could the local merchants be sure that the Europeans were honest merchants who would keep their word and contracts?

Exchange only takes place if a purchaser is sure that the exchange is really beneficial and if he is sure that the other party will act in a way that makes the purchaser be better off. The selling party has to be able to lend credibility to the claim that the purchaser will be better off, but this is not necessarily in the best interest of the supplier. Both parties have different concerns; making huge profits and obtaining a product for lowest possible prices are opposites. The extent to which this fundamental commitment problem is mitigated influences the willingness of both parties to enter exchange relationships.​[26]​ This is called the fundamental problem of exchange. 
	And for the trade between Europeans and local Indian Ocean merchants this fundamental problem of exchange is even more prominent. Trading with an unknown merchant from a far away unknown country with an unknown language seems to be a greater risk than trading with an unknown but local merchant with a familiar language and religion. The control on human interaction, and so for trading consist of formal and informal rules. To trade in foreign regions, knowing the formal rules will only be partially helpful since the informal rules are the most determining in human interaction and these informal rules are much harder to grasp.​[27]​ Trading in foreign regions is therefore a difficult business. It is difficult to expect cooperation if there is not enough information on the trading partner, or when there are a lot of trading partners to choose from.​[28]​ But, in most, if not all, economies, institutions exist that –try to- mitigate this fundamental problem of exchange in order to make exchange possible. In the past and present, these institutions have determined the willingness of merchants to enter into mutually beneficial exchange relationships.​[29]​ Institutions reduce the uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life,​[30]​ and in this case to exchange relationships but this is not to say that the institutions are bound to be efficient. 
	Institutions were and are the instruments to help solve the commitment problem by providing the ability for selling parties to ex-ante commit to respect contractual obligations ex-post and also to show that they are able to. The way that institutions mitigate in the fundamental problem of exchange is by linking past results to future transactions. Within the game theoretical framework, this implies that the game is repeated, by different players, but with preservation of the information gained every time the game was played. The lack of information about the other trading partner now starts to fade away.​[31]​ The goal is to guide, enable and constrain individual behaviour and to create behavioural standard for every individual transacting within the system of the institution which will lead individuals to behave according to the expectations. The system is now self-enforcing.​[32]​ The framework in which human interaction takes place, has now been established and this framework includes both what an individual is allowed and prohibited what to do. The institution also has the obligation to monitor the behavioural codes and to punish the violations in accordance with the severity of the violation.​[33]​
	There is however, another fundamental problem of exchange. The rulers with the ability to protect the property of the participants of economic transactions are also able to expropriate the assets of these participants. So, merchants can benefit from the support rulers or states have to offer but they can also suffer from the power the ruler or the state has to deliberately or not, withhold the merchants from his support.​[34]​  For a proper trading process, secured property rights are necessary. Property rights are the rights individuals exercise over their own labour, goods and services.​[35]​ If a ruler or a state is not able to secure the property rights, it is not likely that foreign merchants will return to repeat the trading game and in that case, the ruler deprives the state, himself and the population from substantial income.​[36]​ This can also be applied in the other way around. If the violation of the property rights is conducted by an external party, the local ruler or the institution to protect the local traders has to intervene. In the case of the VOC, this was very difficult. In Europe, protection costs had become internalized in the transaction costs, while in Asia it remained an individual decision to pay for protect in advance. The result was that the Portuguese were able to introduce armed trading which was taken over by the Dutch and English companies. Every trader in the Southeast Asian waters was now obliged to arm his fleet to protect himself from the Dutch violence. This violence based on internalizes protection costs, was founded in the charter of the company, which gave the VOC a political role. Armed trading was an expensive strategy but the financial successes and the concept of joint stock gathered enormous amounts of money that could be invested in the armed trading, to make even more profits.​[37]​ 
	The armed trading was also facilitated by the military revolution in Europe that occurred from the end of the Middle Ages on. The new military equipment caused an increase in the costs of warfare and to be able to keep the military apparatus going, the European rulers started to extract their revenue from their subjects. In Europe, the competition between the several territorial powers was enormous and this facilitated the military revolution even further because all powers kept developing new strategies.​[38]​ The result was that the European countries developed into several strong military powers. And it is exactly this strong military power, their superior weapons and military organization that enabled the Europeans and for this paper, the Dutch to expand into overseas territories and take control of the Spice Islands and the inter-Asian trade. The overseas expansion relied significantly on the constant use of violence. The military superiority is an important reason for the Dutch hegemony in Asia.​[39]​
	The organization of the European trading networks in Asia relied mainly on the use of violence and it was a successful strategy. But the trading strategies of the already discussed Armenians were not based on the use of military force and there was also no substantial state support from the mother country. Apparently, the cross cultural trade problems and their solutions could all be successful, depending on the circumstances. In the case of the Armenians, coercive power was never an option. The lack of state support and the location of the main centre of the network in a foreign empire made an active policy of diplomacy necessary to obtain privileges and patronage. The network had however a substitute for the state; the church. At the cultural level, the Armenians shared a common language and writing and this resulted in a strong cultural unity within the network. One of the important features of the Armenian trading network is the reliance on family. The family firm tied the social aspect of the family firmly to the economic aspects of the family. This generated shared interests, trust and solidarity within the family as a social and economic unit. Despite their archaic family structure in business, the Armenian trade had a flexible structure which enabled them to adjust to changing supplies and demands from across the world and this turned them into severe competition for the Europeans trading in Asia. 
Both organizational forms can be described as a trading network although the VOC has to be described as a network with a corporate structure. And a trading network is a set of intertwined merchant settlements shattered over a continent or even the world, but with a nodal centre as their focus. Originating from the centre, merchants left to settle in host towns and societies to help encourage the trade between the homeland and the host society. These networks could be organized in many different ways. Informal networks usually shared a common culture and language which generated the trust necessary for economic transactions. The more formal networks like the chartered companies were supported by the state and were granted official monopolies.​[40]​ 







Research is usually carried out in two separate strategies; the case oriented approach and a variable oriented approach. Most of the time the strategies are formulated as opposites of each other and the debate between both strategies is still going on. Both of the strategies have their advantages and their weaknesses. Both the strategies are used in social sciences and can also be applied to the field of history. 
	The case oriented approach is used to explain specific cases or historically defined categories of social phenomena and this implies a small amount of cases. These cases are selected by identifying instances of a phenomenon. The ideal typical research method of the experimental design is approximated by matching the cases as much as possible. The method of agreement and/or method of difference are the strategies for analyzing the theoretical but also concrete similarities and differences among the cases. By treating the cases as wholes, the influence of the context is not minimized and in this way it is possible to determine how different combinations of conditions have the same causal significance and how similar causal factors can operate in opposite directions. The causes can be interpreted in the light of each other and the idea of multiple and conjunctural causation becomes part of the research strategy. The cases are an important component of the analysis and usually the method is characterized by a rich dialogue between ideas and evidence and this makes the case oriented approach evidence oriented. The case oriented approach does not allow for broad generalizations because of the small amount of cases, but this also offers advantages. Historically significant phenomena can be interpreted and the causes of certain historical outcomes can be determined. Modest generalizations are still an option and these can lead up to the development of new theories.​[43]​ 
	The problem with case oriented historians is that they are storytellers. The stories that are told and the sources for these stories are based on choices made by the historian him/herself and this gives the stories a subjective tone. The choice of the historian is always coloured by the worldview of the historian, his particular background, his academic environment. Construction of general models and theories on these stories with a (even if it is only small) subjective component is very difficult. The variable-oriented approach offers more opportunity for the construction and testing of general theories.​[44]​ 	The variable oriented approach is designed to examine variables and their underlying relationships and this is usually done with a great number of cases.  Quantitative methods, and especially the multiple regression techniques are the core of the variable oriented approach. Statistical calculations are used to examine patterns that emerge from a broad view of a phenomenon in a variety of settings and to test them against theories concerning these patterns, so this approach is theory-centered. Statistical control is used to approximate the ideal type of the experimental design. Most of the factors are held constant, while the effect of one variable on another is examined. The second option for statistical control is correcting dependent variables for effects of the independent variable(s). This minimizes the influence of the context. This problem can be solved by using interaction models but the requirements of these models can hardly be met. The primary goal of the variable oriented approach is to test hypotheses based on general theories about relationships between features of, for instance, societies translated into variables. Achieving generality is also an objective of the variable oriented approach to make theories more accurate and more widely applicable. However, this generality objective can only be made possible by making simplified assumptions about the operation of the causes that are being examined. Causal complexity is therefore not interpreted but eliminated. Also, causes are seen as additive and this conflicts with the idea of multiple and conjunctural causation.​[45]​ 
	The variable oriented approach is not very often applied by historians. Quantitative strategies are usually seen as interesting but not useful. The debate about the use of models has the same tone. Testing theories or models is not seen as a job for historians. The models are constructed by scholars in other fields and are based on specific regions with a particular cultural background. The question that always arises is if these models are applicable to other regions and especially if the models are transferable across time. This is not to deny that a universal model or theory is not sought-after by historians, it is only thought to be impossible.​[46]​ Another issue that plays a major role here is the amount of cases available for historians. The amount of specific social phenomena, for instance social revolutions, is usually not enough to be able to use quantitative strategies and the other problem that arises here is one of definition of in this case revolutions.​[47]​ 

Best of both worlds
The desire for developing a more general theory does exist among historians but it is thought to be impossible to look for and test this theory because of the small amount of cases. So the case-oriented approach is used by historians while there is also a wish for the theory-based variable-oriented approach that seem to be incompatible. There is however hope.​[48]​ Although the two approaches seem to be opposites and are usually also described that way, they are in fact complementary. Both strategies have their weaknesses and their advantages and by combining the advantages both strategies can check the each others biases. The result of the combination is called the comparative method. Ragin is one of the pioneers in this field and he has developed this comparative method. In this method, questions about sets of cases that are similar are formulated and solved by comparing the cases. The similarity between the cases is based on a theoretical framework.​[49]​ This method is able to address a large amount of cases but still allow for conjunctural causation analysis. This is done by breaking the wholes of the case-oriented approach into the parts of the variable-oriented approach. After analyzing the parts, it is examined how the parts fit together. The result is a qualitative holistic analysis which compares wholes as combinations of parts.​[50]​ The comparative method still has an intensive dialogue between ideas and evidence but is also theory-centered because theories are the basis for interpretation. However, instead of testing a theory as true or false, alternative explanations can also be considered and tested. The main objective of comparative analysis is identifying and analyzing causal configurations that produce major outcomes.​[51]​ 
To be able to analyze these major outcomes, a specific research strategy is needed and this is the Boolean approach. The first step is to get an overview of these major outcomes by looking at possible explanations, investigated by other researchers. Another possibility is to look at theories that are concerned with the major outcomes. Based on this evidence, it is possible to construct a list of possible causes for the specific major outcomes. The next step is to create a Boolean matrix to order the collected data in a schematic way. The list of causes will be combined with the specific cases. Each row in this table represents a combination of present and absent causes. This presence or absence is coded with a 1 or a 0. Labeling the causes on with 0 or 1 for absence of presence can lead to some loss of information. In cases of uncertainty a cause can be scored between 0 and 1 to show some influence that is not absolute. But this might not be necessary because lots of causes can only be present or absent. A nominal scale (present or absent) is usually a natural characteristic for causes so information loss will not take place. And in the cases were this will happen, the loss usually will not be great. The following step in the Boolean analysis is deriving the Boolean expressions from the rows in the Boolean matrix. These expressions show the causes (present and absent) of the outcome in a simple letter combination. Present and absent causes are both represented in this letter combination, the present causes are put in an upper case letter, the absent ones in a lower case letter. These Boolean expressions reveal the combinatorial design of the Boolean analysis. This aligns with the idea of conjunctural causation because the absence of a cause might just be as important as the presence of a cause. In this way, the context – all factors, whether present or absent – are taken into account to show that present causes usually do not operate in isolation. So, cases are seen as combinations of values and cases with different combinations are compared. The Boolean approach therefore compares wholes as combinations of parts. Complexity seems to be the result but the Boolean approach also contains a minimization strategy in which the letter combinations are reduced to simpler, combined expressions. This minimizing is done by removing the causes that produce the outcome whether they are present or absent and therefore it can be stated that that specific cause does not influence the outcome. The result is an letter combination that reveals the important causes that can be used to write a conclusion in which the contributing causes are explained in context of each other. ​[52]​ 
	In the research field itself, the value of the comparative method seems clear. It combines the advantages of the case-oriented and the variable oriented approach in such a way that the biases of each approach are checked. But how is the Boolean approach relevant for the field of history in general? With the Boolean analysis patterns can be unraveled and these patterns can create new theories or adjust existing ones. With these theories it becomes possible to uncover historical patterns that might be repeated in the future. With a comparative historical analysis lessons from the past can be derived that speak to the concerns of the present.​[53]​ Theory also creates the possibility of studying unobservable elements while upholding the scientific traditions.​[54]​ The method also eliminates the subjective character of the case-oriented approach because the analysis is conducted in a more systematic way. Further, the Boolean analysis is consistent with the usual way of thinking about and understanding of qualitative phenomena, but this is not to say that quantitative strategies are not suitable for these phenomena.​[55]​ The last element of the Boolean analysis that gives it its advantage is that does reduce historical complexity without removing the notion of conjunctural causation. 
Comparing in Asia
In the research field of the European trading companies the wish for applying general theories and models is quite visible. Many articles are written about the idea of chartered trading companies as modern multinationals in which the trading companies are called giants of an earlier capitalism.​[56]​  The wish is also visible in the research concerning the Indian Ocean region. The analytical foundations for the Mediterranean created by Braudel are used to apply to the Indian Ocean.​[57]​ Theories of globalism appear in works about the Arabian seas.​[58]​ And even models of discovery processes can be related to the European expansion in the Indian Ocean.​[59]​  
	General concepts that are discussed in this paper will be trading networks as institutions that mitigate the fundamental problem of exchange. Based on this theoretical framework the Asian continent is subdivided into a maritime and a terrestrial part, in which different trading networks – the Dutch and the Armenian- were active. After researching these parts of the Asian continent, they are again put together to see the parts fit into a general pattern of Indian Ocean transaction costs can be discovered. By keeping track of the theories during the analysis, the intensive dialogue between ideas and the evidence remains intact, while the idea of the theory development is also still present. 
	 The need for subdividing Asia into different regions emanates from a lack of information. The problem with transaction costs in the past is that only those costs that were paid are traceable. Transacting also involves considering several options before the deal is closed but these can not be traced back. Breaking the Asian continent up into several regions in which the trading networks were active it becomes possible to look at several transactions and several ways of organizing the trade and comparing them. Looking at differences and similarities and the why behind them throws a light on the considerations that are made before transactions were made. By applying the Boolean analysis, this is done in a structural, analytical way and the results might contribute to the general theory of transaction costs. 
	Boolean analysis requires a matrix which is presented here but will not yet be filled with 0’s and 1’s. In the two following chapters, two types of trading networks are discussed. In the conclusion, the various strategies the networks used will be compared and the Boolean matrix will be filled. So, at the end of the coclusion, the complete table is presented and provides the basis for the comparative conclusion. Here the Boolean expression are also taking their concrete shape, so the conclusion can also be put in a simple form and after the process of minimization, the influencing factors, present and absent become straightforward. 
	The value of the comparative method for this research paper is already clarified by pointing at the lack of information concerning the considerations before entering a transaction. But there are more reasons to choose for the comparative method. The transactions of both the different networks and the why behind these transactions can be unraveled. The patterns that are found contribute to the validity of the theories about transaction costs and networks as institutions. Historical patterns are uncovered that can be applied to other trading companies in other periods or in different regions and it can be explained why the trading companies did not exist in the same way in different regions. It is even possible that present concerns about information costs, which are an important component of transaction costs, can be interpreted with the information about Indian Ocean transaction costs. The present day concerns that could be interpreted in the light of the findings of this research paper and the value of these interpretations are discussed at the end of the conclusion. 
The Boolean matrix for the Asian continent
Here the empty Boolean matrix is presented, which will be filled at the end of the conclusion. 







Focus on one commodity?		
Political power		
Violence		
Trading overseas; The VOC
The Europeans arrived one by one in the Indian Ocean, hoping to get a hold on the spices that could be sold on the European markets with enormous profits. The first country that tried was Portugal, but they were never able to achieve the incredible successes of the Dutch East India Company. The VOC was not only able to create a virtual monopoly on spices in the Moluccas and Ceylon, but this monopoly became one of the two pillars of the Dutch participation in the entire inter-Asian trade. The other pillar was the exclusive access to the Japanese silver. The Dutch participation in the inter-Asian trade was a unique development, that none of the other European trading companies achieved. The result was that the Dutch trading network of the VOC reached out to all the different regions in the Indian Ocean trade, their influence stretched from Persia to Japan.​[60]​ The reason why the Dutch forced themselves into the inter-Asian trade was to get a positive cash flow. Until the 1630s, maintaining the Dutch fleet, manning the fortresses and the procurement of the spices created a negative balance of payment. Involvement in the inter-Asian trade was the solution to this problem because the profits would make the Dutch in the Indian Ocean more self sufficient. Strategic options were developed and combined to get involved in the already existing Asian trading patterns.​[61]​ The first strategy was to get control of the supply of the commodity at the source, or even take control of the production. The VOC did apply this strategy in their search for profitable spices by taking over several Spice Islands. The second option was to create a strong military and naval presence in the Asian waters to keep rivals – European and Asian- away from the supplying sources and to be able to do this, the VOC was officially allowed to privateer against their rivals. There also was a third strategy, but until the 1630s, this remained theoretical to the VOC. The art of diplomacy was mastered only after the 1630s, because it took the VOC some time to learn the strategies required for the diplomatic interaction with Asian rulers.​[62]​  Both the earlier strategies have numerous examples. In this chapter, the efforts to obtain direct access to the cloves on the Moluccan Islands and the attempts to scare the Chinese into trading contracts will be elaborated. Both strategies are clear examples of the use of violence to get access to the trade the VOC was initially not a part of. Showing the muscles was the strategy that gave the VOC its advantages over their Asian rivals, so they were able to get what they desired, or at least get close to getting their wishes granted. One of the elements of these wishes was the spice monopolies and a lot of effort was put in obtaining these monopolies. Therefore, the spice monopolies are subject of the rest of the chapter. The monopoly on cloves will be elaborated to illustrate the monopoly strategy. 

Obtaining spice monopolies
Gaining direct access to the production of the profitable spices was not an easy objective. In the case of the Banda Islands, the entire area was depopulated and the new settlement was a plantation colony, populated by servants of the company, who were expected to protect the monopoly on mace and nutmeg and slaves who were expected to cultivate the spices. The entire production was destined for the VOC, which bought the spices at a low price. The company servants, who owned the plantation were barely able to survive and had to get loans from the VOC, which made them dependent and limited their opportunities to rebel against the low prices.​[63]​ 
In 1658, the monopoly on cinnamon was realized. After a twenty years war, the 
VOC had been able to expel the Portuguese from Ceylon. The next step was to fortify the coastline to keep intruding rivals away from the island. The interior of Ceylon, where the cinnamon was produced was not under Dutch control but controlled by the kingdom of Kandy. The king had, however, closed a deal with the Dutch, in exchange for the monopoly on the trade in cinnamon the Dutch had to help him defeat the Portuguese. After the Dutch-Kandy victory, the king was in enormous debt to the Dutch, who offered to nullify the debt but with the cinnamon monopoly as reward. Despite the protests of the king, the VOC was practically secured of the monopoly.​[64]​ 
The monopoly on cloves was established in a similar way. After expelling the Portuguese, the local population was bound to the VOC by contracts, signed by local rulers but severe competition from surrounding Islamic islands was a troublesome element that was not easy to eliminate. The next section will deal with the clove monopoly more intensively. 
The clove monopoly
The Portuguese were the first to arrive in the Indian Ocean at the end of the 15th century. In 1511, the key port of Malacca was taken and fortified trading posts were built in the Moluccan Islands. This was the region where the spices grew and these spices were the main objective of the Portuguese expedition into the Indian Ocean. Soon after their arrival, the much sought after spices were declared a monopoly. The Estado da India was to become the only trading partner for local producers. The Asian merchants were prohibited to take part in the spice trade but the competition was hard to eliminate.​[65]​
Throughout the 16th century, the rise in output and prices of spices increased. The Portuguese conducted their business but the Asian merchants also remained active in the spice trade. Their trading routes to Europe ran through West Asia and the Portuguese were never able to destroy this supply route.​[66]​ 
In fact, in the enormous eastern part of the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese crown, represented by the Estado da India only controlled a very small amount of areas: the port-cities of Malacca and Macao and the half dozen of outposts in the Indonesian archipelago, namely Tidore, Amboina and Solor. This limited control was one the reasons for the Dutch spice rush at the beginning of the 17th century. There was no Portuguese resistance, so the Dutch seemed to be able to roam the Indian Ocean region freely. The Portuguese grip on the Moluccan Islands was hindered by fierce opposition from local Muslim rulers and war was a permanent feature. The arrival of the European rivals in the Moluccan Islands meant meddling in these conflicts and therefore trouble for the Portuguese. In 1599, the Dutch allied with one of the local Muslim rulers against an attack from the Portuguese. The hostilities between the Dutch and the Portuguese increased in the following years. The Iberian Crown urged for harsh steps to eliminate the Dutch threat from the Asian waters. But without any results; the Dutch were bound to stay and establish trading relationships in this area.​[67]​ 
 	The capture of the Amboina fortress by the Dutch was a major setback for the Portuguese but it was not the final blow for the Portuguese influence on the Spice Islands. The VOC pursued a clove monopoly for the Amboina Islands but the cloves from the surrounding, Muslim islands were diverted to European competitors and Asian merchants, through the port of Macassar. 
Still, in general it can be stated that the beginning of the 17th century was a turning point. The appearance of the Dutch East India Company in the Indian Ocean marked a shift in trading policies. The VOC was, contrary to the Portuguese Estado da India, able to create a monopoly in the Spice Islands.​[68]​ The property rights of the cloves came into Dutch hands, and the Dutch were not afraid of using violence to secure these property rights. Exclusive rights to the spices offered the VOC lots of advantages of which regulating supply and demand was the most prominent because this gave them the opportunity of controlling prices, which enabled the maximal profits. 
The Dutch entered the spice trade in the early 17th century. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) had just been founded and this company was able to handle uncertainty in supplies, cost prices and fluctuations at the home market in a better way than individual merchants. ​[69]​ The VOC received a monopoly on the trade in the Indian Ocean region, but this was only a national monopoly. In the long term, eliminating all rivals from the spice producing areas was the goal, so the property rights of the cloves would end up in Dutch hands. Obtaining these property rights was a project of several consecutive steps. The first step was organizing trade in a state supported institution, so all military strength could be brought together. The Dutch strategy of violence, military strength and the threat of this military strength was born. The following step was to put this military strength to work and eliminate the Portuguese influence on the Moluccas.​[70]​  On February 23, 1605 the Portuguese castle on Amboina was taken over by the Dutch and this gave them a strategic but small part of the Moluccas. The wish for a spice monopoly was still present and all means were used to obtain this monopoly. The result after fifty years of political and military strength was the total control of the Spice Islands in by the year 1656.​[71]​ The take over of the castle on Amboina transformed the VOC from a merchant into a king and the inhabitants of Amboina turned into Dutch subjects. The VOC inevitably acquired the role of a state, becoming the overlord of thousands of subjects, mostly Amboinese, who were Christians. The ultimate goal with Amboina was commercial and not so much political. Obtaining the property rights of the clove production had a political element but the main purpose was gaining a maximum share in the world trade in Moluccan spices, in particular cloves. Because trade and politics were very interrelated in this period, it was necessary to acquire political control to be able to be commercially successful.​[72]​ The political control of Amboina was exercised from the former Portuguese castle, which had turned into the Dutch seat of the provincial government. This government was low in the governmental hierarchy of the VOC but the distance and slow communication with the VOC headquarters in Amsterdam, gave the provincial government lots of freedom and independence which resulted in taking local customs into account.​[73]​ But still, the goal was to acquire a clove monopoly. 
In the conquered areas, the population was now forced to sell all their cloves to the VOC for a fixed price. The former Portuguese territory consisted of a Christian population. They were willing to work for the VOC in exchange for protection against the Muslim neighbors. These Muslim neighbors, united under the rule of the sultanate of Ternate, were not under total VOC control. The local rulers signed contracts in which they committed to deal solely with the VOC. In return, the VOC would protect the islands against other European aggressors.​[74]​ But this all came at a price. The prices the VOC was willing to pay for the cloves did not correspond with the prices the producers of the cloves expected to get and the VOC had to encounter hostilities from the clove producers.​[75]​ Other merchants were welcomed, so higher profits could be made, but this angered the VOC, which started to enforce the contracts in more rigorous ways. The contact with other merchants was limited, their merchant ships were obstructed at open see, before they could berth on the islands, and also fortresses were built to protect the ports against other merchants. The last action was to start co-ruling the areas. ​[76]​ Full control of the clove production was now possible. The local population saw its freedom getting more limited with every new contract, so violations were frequent.​[77]​ The sultans of Ternate usually were on the Dutch side, their local chiefs on the island of Hitu tried to follow their own directions. In 1633 this turned out into a war which was solved only after the interference of the Dutch governor-general in 1638. The support of the local population, in hope of rising prices for the cloves had waned. The last attempt was the revolt against the sultan in 1650. Some of the Dutch fortresses were taken over. The sultan was not able to handle the revolt, so he gave the VOC permission to suppress the revolt in exchange for political influence. The VOC decided to cut down all the clove trees. The extensive area of clove production was now reduced and the problem of too little policing had disappeared. The main objective of the whole operation, the regulation of the quantity of cloves was now achieved. In 1656, the peace had returned, the VOC had acquired full sovereignty of the Amboina region and the dependencies of the sultanate of Ternate in 1656.​[78]​ And with this full sovereignty came full control of the clove production, which was now completely owned by the Dutch. The property rights had gone to the Dutch and this made possible the much desired clove-monopoly. 
This is not to say that from that moment on, the clove-monopoly was going according to plan. The VOC attempted to regulate the supply by instructing every household to plant 60 more trees in the years 1664-1666 to compensate for the losses of the wars and the declined supply. The result was a clove flood, so further planting was prohibited from 1686 on, but without much results. The producers of Amboina received a fixed price, so the more trees, the more income. In 1692 after a counting of the trees, it was decided that trees, planted after 1686 had to be felled. Some effects of the old age of the trees started to manifest but this would harm the long term supply and stocks in Europe. Again, measures were taken but now stimulation of the clove cultivation was the goal. Until a new clove surplus hit the European market in the 1770s. A new felling policy only worked after strict control. The desired effect of growing sales in Europe was achieved but the price levels were to low to restore the previous profit levels. The struggle between production and consumption of the cloves was mainly focused on Europe. The sale of cloves in Asia was not as important although a special policy was applied. The clove price in Asia was much higher than in Europe, so other European merchants would not buy the cloves in Asia and export them to Europe. This declining sale of cloves in Asia was accepted because of the importance of the high profits on the European market. 
After 1796, the VOC did not have to worry about the clove production because the islands of Amboina fell into British hands.​[79]​ 

The monopoly strategy
Institutions were and are the instruments to help solve the commitment problem by providing the ability for selling parties to ex-ante commit to respect contractual obligations ex-post and also to show that they are able to.​[80]​ Several solutions are available to solve the same commitment problem. The monopoly strategy the Dutch used in the Moluccas is part of the property rights solution. In order to secure the main Dutch objective; the regulation of the quantity of cloves so the prices could be manipulated to keep the profits at their maximum, they decided to take over the Spice Islands and secure the production of cloves. 
The direct access enables the owner of the production to influence the attributes added to the product and claim the profits made on the product and the attributes.​[81]​ The VOC forced their control onto the Spice Islands, eliminated the competition and started to rule the local inhabitants. For the local inhabitants of the Spice Islands, the monopoly was also lucrative because it guaranteed total sales at a fixed price without the exploiting intermediaries. ​[82]​ But to make the monopoly possible, an expensive strategy was required to obtain the property rights that enabled a monopoly and after obtaining the property rights and the establishment of the monopoly, again an expensive strategy is necessary to maintain the monopoly. 
To get hold on the Spice Islands, the Dutch fought 50 years to eliminate the Portuguese and other European competition, but also the local competition had to be defeated, which resulted in 1656 in full sovereignty of the entire region. From that moment on, the property rights and the monopoly had to be maintained. The directors in Amsterdam chose a threefold policy to maintain the clove monopoly. The first was regulating the prices in Europe. In the archipelago, they tried to control the production and tried to limit trade in cloves outside the Company.​[83]​ Eliminating the clove trade outside company control was necessary to eliminate all competition on the clove market. Controlling the production meant a restriction of the clove cultivation to the areas under Company control so the VOC was the only clove supplier in Europe and was therefore able to keep the prices at the desired level. This required the destruction of clove trees on the other islands, which elicited lots of protests from the local population which had to be suppressed by military force. Preventing trade in cloves outside the Company required policing against smuggling and containing the purchase of cloves by rivals at Macassar.​[84]​ The local sultan of Macassar benefited enormously from the illegal spice trade and therefore refused to close his port. The VOC declared war on him and after two years Macassar was taken over in 1669 and the Dutch settled in the existing fortification. Thereafter, trading with Macassar was only possible with Dutch consent. Strict regulations were monitored by small fleets and with success but at the beginning of the 18th century, Macassar lost its position as trading hub of the archipelago because of the strict regulations.​[85]​  The military operation was a costly business but it was compensated for by the enormous clove profits. 
In obtaining the total control of the production of the cloves, the clove producing islands of Amboina turned into VOC property. There was little to no space for the local producers to control their own trees, the sale of the output and the possible profits that could be made. The local population lost their property rights. They were no longer able to appropriate their own labour, goods and services.​[86]​ In the case of the Amboina region, the VOC can be seen as the party with the monopoly on coercive power. Their military might was no match for the local rulers and population and in this way, the VOC was able to expropriate the clove producers on Amboina. The producers/sellers of the cloves were unable to overcome this abuse because they were unable to organize themselves and undertake collective actions; the military might of the VOC withheld them. The Muslim neighbours, who were not under VOC control, tried to undermine the VOC monopoly by selling cloves to other parties than the VOC. The contracts the sultans had signed were now enforced in more and more compelling ways by limiting the contact possibilities with other parties. The resulting revolt was suppressed in a violent way. Again, the VOC expropriated the Muslim neighbours but without much repercussion. Any problem, uprising, or protest was turned down with their military strength. 
	So, the Dutch strategy was obtaining the property rights of the cloves which enabled them to control the flow of the cloves so, they were able to control the price of the cloves on the Dutch market. The monopoly on coercive power gave the Dutch the opportunity to expropriate the local population, who was unable to organize themselves against the VOC. Every attempt by locals to organize themselves was repressed by the use of violence. The use of violence was unseen in the Southeast Asian waters. And this gave the VOC the unprecedented opportunity to get hold on the cloves (and other spices) and maintain their position. 
	The monopoly strategy is not just about the property rights. In the case of the cloves and other spices, the monopoly on coercive power is just as important.  The role of the use of violence can also be found in other regions where the Dutch tried to get a foothold in the existing trading patterns. One example is the Dutch attempts to trade in China. 

Dutch attempts to trade in China 
The relationship between trade and the Chinese state is somewhat peculiar and opposite to the Dutch relationship between state and trade. Therefore in this chapter, the Chinese state and the trade policy of this state will first be elaborated. Then the Dutch options for entering the Chinese trade patterns will be discussed, just as the Dutch reasons for choosing some options and not the others, which will lead to a short conclusion about the military and naval presence as one of the elements of the Dutch strategies to enter the trading world in Southeast Asia. 
 	The Ming dynasty, ruling China from 1368 until 1644 used the ocean as a barrier to keep foreigners out of China. China tried to keep the country as closed as possible, so the culture could be preserved as much as possible. Besides preserving the culture, it also salved the imperial court the costs of maintaining an expensive navy.​[87]​ The famous Maritime Prohibition forbade all contact between China and overseas foreigners unless the contact took place within formal missions, which meant official diplomatic embassies. Chinese were also no longer permitted to sail abroad. The result was a rise in formal missions, in size and expenses since this was the only possibility to encounter foreign merchants. The prohibition also increased the scale of smuggling which extended into piracy. In 1567, the new emperor lifted the prohibition on Chinese sailing abroad, but still foreigners were not allowed to enter China. Sailing abroad was now allowed but only with licenses the imperial government handed out and had to be renewed every year.​[88]​ The only exception was Japan, which remained banned for Chinese merchants, even though trading with Japan was the most lucrative trade for China. Chinese merchants had several options to overcome this prohibition. The first one was keep trading illegally with Japan and the second option was to meet the Japanese traders on neutral grounds in Southeast and East Asia and especially Taiwan was a suitable place. The use of European intermediaries was the third option.​[89]​  The illegal trade was a very risky business and the second option of meeting on neutral grounds was an expensive option because of the sailing back and forth with valuable goods. The use of intermediaries got around both of these problems. 
	Trading on neutral grounds but especially the hiring of intermediaries created opportunities for the Europeans; it offered them a chance to work themselves up in a part of the inter-Asian trade. The Europeans were very well fitted for this objective. They entered the Chinese waters in an organized way; the European companies were backed with state support, military force and the rights to wage war and make treaties. In the Southeast Asian waters, the companies represented their states.​[90]​ And in the first half of the 17th century, the VOC was able to use its naval power to get a dominant position in the Chinese market.​[91]​ For the Ming state in China, this Dutch way of trading with state licensed companies was completely new and seen as a very strange approach to trading. Trade in China was seen as a necessary evil and not as something a state should encourage and support. In their view, the European companies were nothing but state licensed pirates, which was something they fiercely tried to fight.​[92]​ 
This Chinese attitude towards the VOC did not stop the Dutch from trying to muscle themselves into the Chinese trading patterns. After obtaining direct control of the Spice Islands, the Dutch tried to advance into Southeast and East Asia. The Dutch deliberately kept their distance from Malacca and settled at the other passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, at the Sunda Strait. In 1619, Batavia was established​[93]​ but already in 1613, the VOC was aware of the importance trading directly with China and in the 1620 several attempts were made to get a foothold in China, but without the desired results, because none of the attempts resulted in direct trade with China.​[94]​ An unsuccessful siege of Macao in 1622 and several attempts on the Chinese mainland in 1624 made that the Dutch had to divert to the islands between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. China fiercely opposed this settlement and demanded withdrawal and offered them Taiwan as the new location to settle and to trade.​[95]​ This settlement was still not what the Dutch hoped for because it left the Dutch again without direct access to the Chinese markets.​[96]​ However, it also offered opportunities; Taiwan was outside the jurisdiction of the Chinese empire, so therefore it had served as a trading beach for the smuggling between China and Japan. The Dutch were able to set up the triangular trade between China, Taiwan and Japan which started to be successful from 1633 onwards.​[97]​ Destroying the Portuguese influence in the Far East was, besides gaining foothold in China, the other objective of the VOC policy in East Asia. In 1639, the Portuguese were forced to leave Nagasaki and in 1641, the Dutch took over Malacca. From that moment on, the Dutch became the dominant Western maritime power in the Southeast Asia, but without their own territory and without political power. This left the Dutch very little room to alter the organization producing and obtaining the East-Asian products.​[98]​ Free trade in the Chinese waters was what the VOC desired, but with the Chinese ban on foreign entry this was impossible. The island of Taiwan did offer some possibilities because China allowed few merchants to trade at Taiwan. The amount of merchants and the quantity of their deliveries were too small from the Dutch perspective. To increase the trade with China, the VOC had to undertake action, which could either be diplomacy or force. The choice appears to have been something in between both options. 
Taiwan was the home of pirates who controlled the illegal Sino-Japanese trade. They sailed illegally to Japan and brought the Japanese commodities to Taiwan where Chinese merchants bought the commodities and shipped them to the Chinese mainland.  The Dutch tried to use the pirates as ambassadors, applying for free trade, but very soon the pirates turned out to be unreliable because they started to pillage Chinese junks loaded with goods for the Dutch on Taiwan which was a threat for the small -but existing- trade with China.​[99]​ However, pirates could also be useful. In 1625, Zheng Zhilong succeeded the pirate networks operating from Taiwan. His growing power worried the Chinese officials and the Dutch were asked for help in defeating Zhilong in exchange for free trade. Because the Dutch used Zhilong as a privateer, they wanted to compromise. The free trade quarrel continued because both parties refused grant each others wishes. 
First, the Chinese turned down the Dutch idea of compromising with the threat of ceasing all Chinese-Dutch trade. Now the Dutch hurried to comply but were too slow in acting on their promises. Then the Chinese tried to restrain Zhilongs power by turning him into an official, who was expected to fight the pirates. The Dutch offered their support to Zhilong in return for –again- free trade, but this was put on hold after the Zhilong-Dutch victory. Then, the Dutch governor of Taiwan decided to revert to showing the Dutch military might, by establishing a pirate force.​[100]​ “The VOC, after all, was designed as an instrument both of war and trade.”​[101]​ But this Dutch pirate force was unable to establish the free trade the VOC desired and instead, Zhilong was able to force the Dutch to retreat –again– to Taiwan. But despite his victory, Zhilong was also willing to compromise by offering the Dutch more trading licenses for Taiwan. Even though it was not free trade, the trading conditions had improved, so the Dutch agreed.​[102]​ 
The combination of political games and the use of military might had created better trading opportunities for the VOC. Again, the use of violence helped the Dutch to muscle themselves into the trading patterns in Southeast Asia. 
In the next five years, the Dutch were able to profit from the booming silk trade carried by Chinese merchants to Taiwan, where the silk was transshipped on VOC ships to be carried to Japan were the silk was exchanged for silver.​[103]​ In 1641, the main supplier of the silk bypassed Taiwan and sailed directly to Japan. This was the start of the decline of the Dutch silk profits. And from the 1650s on, this pirate-merchant named Chenggong was able to challenge the Dutch supremacy in trade organization. Deeply engaged into politics, this pirate financed the struggle against the new found Manchu dynasty in China with his gaining from trading business. The Dutch advantage of state support was now nullified and the result was a threat to the position of the VOC at Taiwan.​[104]​ New attempts were made to gain access to the Chinese mainland. This time, the Dutch chose the diplomatic way and from 1655 on, several embassies were sent to the Chinese imperial court.​[105]​

The strategy of military and naval presence in China
In order to get what they desired, the VOC developed a number of strategies, including privateering and warfare. It took the Company until 1630 for the desired results to be produced by employing a more diplomatic approach.​[106]​ The first strategy was to get full control over the trade at the indigenous sources of supply or even over the production itself. Secondly, they could build up a military and naval presence in the East and keep competitors away from the Asian sources of supply or chase and capture their vessels once they were loaded with the desired products. The third strategy was diplomacy towards the Asian rulers.​[107]​ 
	In the case of the Chinese trade, the first strategy was impossible to apply. The Dutch, without a doubt wanted to have access to the silk production in China, but because of the Maritime Prohibition, no foreigners were allowed to enter the Chinese territory. The following option was the creation of a military and naval presence in the Chinese waters, which was successfully applied. From 1621 until 1624, the Dutch were showing their might at sea by seizing vessels, by attacking Macao and attempting to get a hold onto the islands of Penghu. The results were disappointing, but in 1624 the Dutch were allowed to settle on Taiwan. But this was not what the Dutch had in mind, instead they dreamt of free trade in the Chinese waters. Again the Dutch resorted to the use of their military powers, to violence and with successes. Free trade in the Chinese waters was never granted to the Dutch but by showing that they could be a threat when provoked; the Dutch were able to impose better trading conditions and from that moment on, the threat of violence was used to keep pressure on China to maintain the trade.​[108]​ 
This threat with and the use of violence was characteristic of the VOC success in the Southeast Asian waters. The organization, cohesion and staying power of the state and the trading companies in combination with interest in maritime expansion gave the Europeans their great advantage over their Asian counterparts.​[109]​ 

In the early period of the European expansion, without the great trading companies, the Europeans lacked military presence which gave the Asian rulers the chance to keep European ambitions at bay. ​[110]​ But with the charter of the VOC, which gave her the right to engage in economic warfare, otherwise known as piracy. The charter gave the VOC the right to negotiate treaties with foreign powers as if it was a sovereign state. The Chinese merchants had no such organization and therefore no legal legitimacy. The pirate leaders that were able to gain a position as an official had to give up their piracy.​[111]​ This is not to say that the Southeast Asian rulers lacked any military power, they just did not address this power to the merchants. The Chinese had a military tradition of firearms, fortresses and warships, even if firearms were only a minor part of the Chinese armament. The European military technology received a lot of attention in China, mostly because the attainability of the technology came at a period of political disintegration. But, as soon as stability was restored, the interest waned again. ​[112]​
So, the Chinese had the military technology the Europeans had, but did not use it in the same way. As a result, the VOC was able to use their military might, threatening alone could be enough, to enforce trading in a way they had in vision.  This is not to say that the Chinese were not as developed as the European states. Already in the 1520s, the Chinese ships sailed the seas with armed ships, which were also used in battles at sea. In the 1550s however, the imperial court decided that artillery was not the right way to fight enemies, like the Japanese pirates along the Chinese shore, the ship-borne artillery was dismissed as being too inaccurate. This contrasted sharply with European ideas. Here from 1450 on, the ships first increased in size, and than were equipped with crossbows and handguns. Very soon, heavier artillery was added and the European seaborne power was born.​[113]​ And this naval power gave the Europeans their great advantage. The superiority of the Western weaponry and military organization became a central aspect of the European overseas expansion. The Europeans were, in contrast to the local population in Asia, prepared to fight dirty and prepared to kill and the mastery of the gun was very helpful. If the Asians had guns, they were usually inferior to the European guns, so the Europeans had a clear advantage. The European tactic of siege warfare was also new for the Asians, and usually it was responded to with immediate surrender or temporary flight. After the European victory, fortresses were built, which were impregnable for the Asians so the Europeans were able to keep in control of trade, they recently had taken over.​[114]​ So, the European military advantages enabled the Dutch to enter the Chinese trading patterns. 
The VOC strategy in Southeast Asia
The VOC was the stronger military power, which gave them advantages when they went abroad. It was relatively easy to impress the Asian population, who were very soon willing to surrender. Violence and the threat of violence were the instruments that gave the VOC the control of the long distance trade overseas. In economic transactions, two types of problems can appear. One of them is the problem of violence. And in this case violence means the attempts of parties not involved in the economic transactions to damage the parties that are involved in the transaction.​[115]​ In the case of the VOC in Asia, it is clear that violence was used to give the VOC the access to the profitable transactions of the Sino-Japanese silk trade and the much more profitable trade in spices. The existing trade patterns, the rules of the game of the existing silk and spice trade were all overridden so the VOC could get their access and most of all their desired profits. The local rulers were not able to protect themselves and their merchants against the overwhelming power of the VOC. In the Indonesian archipelago, this resulted in spice monopolies for the VOC. The local population’s property rights were taken over and there was nothing they could do to counter the VOC. The Chinese authorities had to give in to the Dutch demands for expanding the trade with China, although the Chinese were strong enough to withhold the Dutch claim for free trade. Both parties had to compromise; the Dutch wanted free trade, the Chinese wanted to keep the Dutch out but because of the Dutch violence, the Chinese had to give in. 
After examining the Dutch presence on the Spice Islands and in China, the question is if there is a standard option, or combination of options the VOC chose for entering the trading patterns in the Indian Ocean region. 
Overriding the existing rules of the game of trading was the strategy the VOC applied in the Southeast Asian waters, and with success. It did not always bring about the desired objectives but in most cases, the VOC was able to get very close to them. The military superiority was the decisive strategy the VOC used to enter the trading patterns in the Southeast Asian waters. In the Amboina region, the VOC was able to obtain the property rights of the cloves by overthrowing the local population. Elimination of the competition was the other important factor, but again this elimination was made possible by the overwhelming military might the VOC possessed. In China, the threat and the use of Dutch violence in battle between China and the Chinese pirates forced the Chinese authorities to compromise. It was no longer possible to keep the Dutch out of their waters. 
	The organization into a corporation made this possible for the VOC. The economizing on transaction costs and the spread of risks gave the VOC the means to become the superior power in the Asian waters. This organizational superiority in combination with the military superiority is the success factor of the VOC. The initial successes of the corporation structure in the Asian waters gave way to the growing dominance of the corporation in the organization of the long distance trade over the whole world.​[116]​ And while the corporation was the instrument, the main strategy was overriding the existing rules of the game of trading. The VOC tried to mitigate their fundamental problem of exchange by altering the rules of the game. With the use of violence the VOC was able to secure the necessary condition of the ex-ante commitment to fulfil the contractual obligations ex-post.  

The question that arises next is linked to the general question of this thesis. If the VOC had developed such a successful strategy to enter the game of trading in the Southeast Asian waters, why were they not able to penetrate the trading world of the Arabian Seas in the same way? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the existing organization of the trade in the region of the Arabian Seas, before the European entry. The long distance trading patterns in this region of the Indian Ocean differ from the trading patterns in Southeast Asia in several ways. The first striking difference is the organization of the trade; instead of trading overseas, trading overland predominated. Several merchant networks existed, but the main network was that of the Armenians. So, the Armenian network will be discussed in the next chapter. 


Trading overland; The Armenians 
In the introduction, the existence of trading networks in the Indian Ocean has already been mentioned. “Trade in the Indian Ocean existed long before the Europeans even discovered this region, so the Europeans were not the ones who brought ‘an age of commerce’ to the Indian Ocean region. The economy the Europeans found at their arrival was not one of self-sufficiency and with little to no trade.​[117]​ The economy the Europeans found was just as developed as their own despite the European absence.”
The most important trading network in the 17th century was the overland network of the Armenians. 
For pre-industrial economies, it is thought that the costs of transportation are a large part of the total costs of products. Overland transport was much more expensive than overseas transport. On the Iranian plateau, the terrain was hostile and the distances were vast. The means of transportation overland are usually slow and navigation can be difficult if the entire landscape is covered in sand.​[118]​ But still, the Iranian plateau has always known long distance trade. The plateau has always facilitated the trade of the Asian oases to the hinterland and the trading centres of the Indian subcontinent to the Persian Gulf, the Levant and further into Europe.​[119]​ The rise of the European seaborne trading companies did circumvent the trade through the Levant and got around the high overland transportation costs. The next development would be a decline in the overland trade from Asia to Europe until it would have ceased completely. The opposite it true. Instead of a decline, one famous overland trading network, that of the Armenians started to flourish around the same time the European trading companies entered the Indian Ocean and the inter Asian trading networks. 
	The overwhelming military strength of the VOC at sea impeded the VOC possibilities to enter the trading patterns in this region of the Indian Ocean. The local trade between the different regions in the Arabian Seas was conducted over seas but the long distance trade was in hands of the overland trading Armenians. So the question why the VOC was not able to penetrate the trading patterns in the Arabian Seas and control the flow of commodities to Europe requires a closer look at the Armenian trading network. The strategies of the Armenians will be examined to establish their success factor and a comparison with the VOC strategies will help to explain the failures of the VOC to enter the trading patterns in the Arabian Seas. 
Overland trading networks
Overseas trading networks, based on the trading companies founded in Europe expanded enormously in the 17th century. Their influence in the Southeast and East Asian waters increased during this period and was the basis for the later colonization of the area in later centuries. The increasing flow of commodities by sea affected the commodity flow overland. The trading routes through the Levant saw their pepper flow dry up, but it was not a major setback for the overland trading routes. The bulk of the “European”-“Asian” trade was conducted through the Levant and that commerce was closely related to that of the Arabian seas.​[120]​ Many alternative routes from the Persian Gulf to Europe existed and they were mostly complementary.​[121]​ The Mediterranean, the Arabian seas, Eastern Europe and the steppes of Central Asia were also closely tied together by interlocking merchant networks, the natios, who were shattered along the caravan routes.​[122]​ These trading networks existed already before the European arrival in the Indian Ocean and they were able to maintain their position and even extend their trading networks into the 17th and 18th century.​[123]​ Roads via Suez, through Anatolia and the Syrian Desert, the Caucasus and the Crimea already closely linked the Arabian seas, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe before the sixteenth century, so before the European arrival, and continued to connect the areas, until at least the end of the 17th century. The region was occupied by many ethnic merchants from all over Asia and beyond. Sephardic Jews from Spain and Portugal and also Venetian merchant houses had found their way to the overland routes through the Levant into Central Asia, and they existed already in the 15th century.​[124]​ 
The Sephardic Jews had a major role in the maritime, commercial and colonial expansion of Europe in the period from 1492 until the late 18th century. The relations of Western Europe with Islamic North Africa and the Near East are to a great extent determined by the Jewish trading networks. Their influence was noticeable in all of the six great seaborne empires in Europe; the Venetian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English and French because the contributed to the shipping and the finance of the commercial centres in Europe, which culminated in the period between 1750 and 1850.​[125]​ These Jewish networks were mainly involved in the maritime trading in the Middle East and so contributed to the growth of the European powers. The influence of the Jews in the overland trade is somewhat ambiguous. The Jews in the Safavid Empire were probably engaged in trade but this was mostly peddling trade. The European companies described the Jews in the Safavid Empire mainly as moneylenders for the companies themselves. This evidence points in the direction of the importance of the Jews for the European maritime expansion. There seemed to have been Jewish merchants active in the silk trade, but their number is very limited.​[126]​ So, therefore the role of the Jewish merchants in the overland trade is not as important as their Armenian counterparts.

The Armenian trading network
The most ‘famous’ overland trading network in the early modern period is that of the Armenian merchants. This was an independent network that operated alongside the European maritime trading in Asia that mainly focused on trading over land. The very strategic location of the Armenian homeland was perfect for overland trade between Europe and Asia. Enclosed by the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean, overland trade was forced to travel through or near Armenia. But not all overland routes passed through Armenia but on most of the caravan routes, Armenian merchants were active, since ancient times. Several times in history, the Armenian region was the centre of great territorial powers, but this was never achieved after the 11th century. However, along the trading routes, trade colonies were established, so Armenian settlements could be found all over the Eurasian continent, from Bruges in Belgium to the Levant and further into Central Asia In the Middle East, trading relations with the Ottomans were established before Constantinople was captured and the Armenians in the Crimea were very successful in the 14th and 15th century. When the Turks took over this region in 1475, many Armenians moved into Eastern Europe, which extended their trading network further westwards. In the 16th century, the Armenian merchants were even active in India, but their influence started to spread across the Indian Ocean region from 1600 onwards.​[127]​ The Armenian commerce has linked India and Persia with Europe, via trading routes in the Levant and the Caucasus. In the 16th century, this trade expanded and the Armenians settled in numerous towns throughout the Eurasian continent. The expanding trade benefited the Armenian homeland and capital of Julfa. The great prosperity was yet to come.​[128]​
A decree by Shah Abbas I of Persia ordered a deportation of inhabitants of Eastern Armenia after the Ottomans tried to expand into Armenia in 1605. This caused a scorched-earth policy from the Safavid shah who afterwards ordered the decree. The entire merchant population had to settle outside the new capital of the Safavid Empire, Isfahan. The result was a Muslim political centre and a commercial centre, inhabited by the Armenian merchants, New Julfa. The Armenians established a close relationship with the shah who gave them the opportunity to expand their trading network even further and the Armenian trading network operating from New Julfa became very successful in the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century. But this was not an entirely new network; it was placed on top of the old diaspora that already existed long before the successful 17th century.​[129]​ To encourage the trading activities of the merchants of New Julfa, the shah granted the merchants of New Julfa numerous rights and exemptions, and with success. The Armenian trading network expanded quickly and reached from Western Europe to the outposts of Southeast Asia, with New Julfa as the main centre, which was seen as home to most of the Armenians traders abroad.​[130]​ 
The Armenian trading network was characterized by tight bonds of solidarity and trust. These bonds were based on the awareness of belonging to one nation and to one, independent church. This church provided the organization of mutual self-support which strengthened the Armenian bonds even further. It was therefore necessary to have their own church in every ‘colony’ of Armenians abroad and this was a privilege the Armenians always tried to arrange.​[131]​ Hierarchy based on fortune and participation in the affairs of the nation created a social stratification in the network.​[132]​ The prominent merchants of New Julfa employed other merchants, so they never had to travel and were able to participate in the state affairs.​[133]​ At the cultural level, the Armenians shared a common language which had its own writing and they also used their own calendar. 
The result was an incredible strong cultural unity that was indissoluble from the trading network itself. There was no clear distinction between the social and the economic aspects of the network. The cultural cohesion provided the trust and the solidarity needed for the economic transactions.​[134]​ This was also visible in the correspondence between the Armenians in New Julfa and the rest of the network across the Eurasian continent. In business letters, the news about well being of family members is also being written down, but even when the family news is nothing but tragedy, the letters always contains business information too.​[135]​ There was another specific characteristic for the Armenian trading network. The Armenians had mastered the art of the trade and all additional necessary skills as calculation, in detail. The Armenians were true masters of their art.​[136]​ 
The Armenian trading network had developed into a well functioning merchant society, and this process had started well before the 17th century. The Armenians had been very well able to adapt their trading patterns to the supply and demand from their surrounding regions and beyond. And especially in the trade of silk, the Armenians turned out to be experts.​[137]​ In 1619, the silk market was temporarily taken over by the English. But already in 1620, the Armenians took over the control again. The influx of foreign capital into the Safavid Empire was becoming more difficult because the trade in the most important commodity was occupied by the Armenians, who were able to maintain their position after the Safavid royal monopoly on the silk trade was lifted in 1629.​[138]​ Armenian merchants were now able to obtain their silk supplies directly from the producers. At the same time, the European competition started to press on the Safavid silk market. The Armenians were fragile in the face of the European companies because they had no state support or giant companies to execute their trade; they were dependent on the protection of foreign rulers. The active diplomatic policy and the franchises the Armenians had in the Safavid Empire enabled them to obtain the silk much easier than their European rivals. The English indeed recognized in the Armenians an impressive rival.​[139]​ 
So, the tight bonds of solidarity and trust, provided by the religion, the feeling of belonging to the Armenian nation and the shared cultural aspects, were the foundations of the Armenian trading network. The cultural cohesion provided the already mentioned bonds, which needed for the economic transactions. All Armenians were part of the network and had their own specific role as a correspondent, trading partner, peddler in the entire system of the long distance trade.​[140]​ The Armenians lacked the state supported organization that turned the VOC into a successful trading network. However, the Armenian bonds were a successful necessity for their business strategies and that bonds were usually not present in the corporate structure of the VOC. 
The family firm
The family firm is a common business strategy among Armenian merchants and virtually every other merchant network.​[141]​ A family firm is a business governed and managed by members of the same family – or a small number of families. The management is cross-generational, so the business vision will endure.​[142]​ Although this is definition of modern day firms, it still can be applied to the early modern period because in most early modern societies outside Europe, the extended family had a significant role in the long distance trade and the Armenians belonged to this type of societies. The family was usually the centre of the business, in which the merchant houses operated as household economies.​[143]​ The patriarchal family structure was used in either the social organization of the family and in the economic organization of the trading business.​[144]​ The dividing line between the family as a social unit and the family as an economic unit was never very evident​[145]​ and Armenian families were very large, so the trading business could be conducted by several generations of the family and at a specific moment, the jobs available could be filled with family members. Because of the size of the trading network, it was impossible for merchants to conduct all the trade themselves. But travelling to the distant markets or even migrating there was essential for the maintaining of the networks in remote places. The solution was to send representatives but merchants needed to send someone they could trust.​[146]​ And then, the best option seems to be a family member. The extended family structure provides that the business interests of the both the merchant and the agent will converge to a great extent with the interest of the family and the family business, so both will survival of the family as a social and an economic unit ​[147]​ In the Armenian merchant houses, the patriarch function belonged to the eldest male, and the rest of the family also worked in the family business and some of them travelled across the ‘Armenian trading world’ or even settled somewhere in this world.​[148]​ 
In Europe, the family as the economic unit was not as important as for the Armenian trading network. The Dutch VOC was organized as a corporation. This organizational form allowed to own property, contract other parties, regulate their own internal affairs and this was all governed by their own internal administration. The VOC was organized as a joint-stock corporation. Investors were stockholders but investors were not necessarily the merchants working for the company. The main advantages of the joint stock corporation were the spread of risk and the reduction of the transaction costs.​[149]​  The focus on the nuclear family instead of the extended family in Europe was probably the reason for the rise of the more impersonal organizational forms as the corporation. European collective action could not be based on the family in the same way, the Armenians – and the rest of the world outside Western Europe- organized their collective actions. The gap had to be filled and the non family institutions, like the corporation, were born. In Europe, the corporation substituted for the extended family.​[150]​ 

The close relation between the family as a social unit and the family as an economic unit in the Armenian network is visible in the correspondence between the various branches of the Armenian merchant houses; letters always contain business information but start with news about the family well being.​[151]​
 	The advantage of the family firm was that the available capital could be kept within the family, even if the trading business spread over the world or expanded into new areas. Armenians preferred trading with family members, or when that was not possible, other Armenians. ​[152]​  In a family, mutual bonds of trust and solidarity are practically guaranteed and within the Armenian community, the cultural ties provided the trust and solidarity that were necessary for the economic transactions. Dealing with family members increased the change that both parties involved in the transaction will ex ante commit to fulfil the contractual obligations ex-post.​[153]​ The bonds of trust and solidarity created by the social unit of the family reduced the change for cheating in the economic unit of the family because of the shared family interests. Sending agents abroad contains the risk of opportunism because the agent can disappear with the money into markets where none of the associates has control. But by using family members as agents, this change decreases because it is less likely that family members will cheat on each other. The shared property rights, because the capital is family-based will diminish the chances for expropriation.​[154]​ Even though reputation mechanisms do not work, in the case of the Armenian family firm it seems to be possible to apply the mechanism. A bilateral mechanism is an agreement between two parties. If one of the parties cheats on the other, the transaction will never take place again because the abused party will withdraw from doing business with the cheating party again. In the case of the multilateral reputation mechanism, the group where the abused party is part of will withdraw from doing business with the cheater ever again.​[155]​ In the case of the family firm both the mechanisms can be seen as a successful protection against cheating. The reputation of the agent within the family is –probably- more important to him than the short term gains of expropriating the part of the family capital, because taking a part of the family capital will deprive him of future jobs in the family firm and of income. In the larger network, the multilateral reputation mechanism is at work. The strong social cohesion of and the fast correspondence within the trading network will not only deprive the agent from future jobs within his own family firm but also from jobs at other firms. 
The commenda
The family firm was not the only business strategy the Armenians used. The family firm also employed unrelated agents, whose employment was arranged by means of a contract. The partnership arrangement between the merchant-capitalist and his unrelated agents was based on the Astrakhan Code of Laws, which is specific for the Armenians although the partnership is very similar to the commenda.​[156]​ A commenda is a contract involving two parties, an investing party, the Armenian family firm and the travelling party, which was the unrelated agent. The contract regulated the relationship between both parties at several levels. The first level was the organization of the partnership, by determining what nature of the investment, capital and/or goods. The second element was the employment arrangement for the travelling party, because his investment consisted of labour. Agency was the third aspect of the contract, in which the amount of freedom of decision by the agent was settled. The contract also arranged the liabilities of the agent and the investor. The last part of the contract concerned the division of the profits the agent was able to make and the 75-25% division was the most common; the 75% was for the investing party.​[157]​ One more element contract of the commenda was the obligation of bookkeeping.​[158]​ The commenda was in essence a contract between two parties for a single venture contract. For every new trip abroad, a new contract had to be set up. The VOC, designed as a corporation, was a durable institution with an own entity. Therefore, capital could be accumulated over time within the company. 
	The result of the use of the commenda –next to the use of family members as agents –was that circulation of capital and men became a central feature of the Armenian network. However, the rich merchants from New Julfa, khwaja, hardly ever travelled, but hired the agents to do that part of the job for them. The selection of the agents by the khwaja was probably based on the experience of the agents and more important, his reputation. With more experience, the agent could also expect to get a higher share of the profits because experience meant trustworthiness. Experience indicates repeated game play and this past conduct is related to the future reward and the expectation of the khwaja is that this particular agent will ex ante commit to respect his contractual obligations ex post.​[159]​ Monitoring of the agents was remained one of the jobs of the khwaja and in the case of inexperienced agents, this monitoring was even more crucial. This monitoring also included letters with advice and instructions, which were sent to the agent by the Armenian courier system. The more experienced the agent, the less monitoring was required.​[160]​ Protection against opportunism was therefore arranged in two ways: the contract, which specified the obligations the agent had and the monitoring system. The use of family members as agents was another form of insurance, because those agents were even more inclined to protect the capital, because it was not only the khwaja’s capital but also theirs. The settlement of agents at the distant markets was another possibility. After the agents –family or not- had proven their value; they remained abroad and settled in the host society to be a permanent trading partner.​[161]​ The Armenian communities abroad served as a host for the travelling Armenians and fulfilled other professions that could contribute to the trading network.​[162]​  
The first step to become an agent was the informal training in the economic unit of the family. The next step was travelling for his family or another khwaja and put the skills from the informal training in practise. The Armenian society however, offered another option. In New Julfa there was a school specialized in training for the art of commerce. Besides several courses about the meaning of commerce for society, the necessity of trust and honesty, the training also provided a manual with detailed information about travelling and especially trading abroad. Prices, customs, currencies and weights of the various markets around the world were recorded in this manual. The most important component of the training was the education in calculation and mathematics.​[163]​ Part of the problem of information asymmetry can be reduced with the information from the manual. Information asymmetry arises when one party knows more about the values of the product than the other party, which might result in cheating when the selling party gains from concealing information about the values of the product. The selling party will cheat, steal or lie when this is more profitable than trading in an honest matter.​[164]​ The lack of standardized weights makes cheating easier because the foreign merchant lacks the knowledge of the volume of the regionally different weights. For Armenians, with their manual, this was no longer a problem. Their specific knowledge also gave them advantages in the competition with their rivals. Interacting with foreign merchants also requires knowledge about the local culture, religion and political climate and this could only be learned on location. 
The correspondence
The functioning of the Armenian network was not just based on the use of the commenda. Other elements are important as well and one of these elements was the correspondence system the Armenians had developed. 
The courier network was the instrument that connected the communities in the network to each other and to the centre of the network, New Julfa​[165]​ and the news that the Armenians brought to New Julfa, after their trips but off course also in the letters was also very important. It concerned business information, family matters but also news about the European political map and military developments.​[166]​ The courier system the Armenians used was run by their own community but European companies throughout Asia also hired the Armenians for the transport of messages because this was, according to them, the best system available.​[167]​
	News was – and is- a very important commodity for merchants. News about the prices, weights and currency rates does not require further explanation. Information about the well being of family abroad, the conduct of business by the agents was very necessary and desired. Information was a precious commodity, so effort was put in keeping the rivals from the vital information. ​[168]​ In the Armenian letters that circulated, a peculiar writing was used, one of the characteristics of the Armenian cultural unity. This Julfan dialect was only understood by Armenians themselves, so it was the perfect communication medium.​[169]​ 
The letters and the stories of the travelling agents also gave an account of the latest gossip.​[170]​ Especially this last category of ‘news’ was important for the business of trade. It allowed the possibility of monitoring the agents abroad but it also provided information about agents, hired by other khwaja’s. The information about the fellow agents learned the entire Armenian community about the trustworthiness of that specific agent. Based on this news the reputation of the agent was determined and because of the travelling speed of gossip, agents tried to preserve their reputation as much as possible. The gains from cheating would not outweigh the long term damage this would cause to their reputation, which was strongly related to their future income.​[171]​ 
	The news about the political arena in Europe was important because it could affect the trading communities there, it could affect the conduct of the trade to and from Europe. However, this is true for all political news from all over the network. The Armenians depended on an active policy of diplomacy because of their lack of Armenian state support. This created a very remarkable aspect of the Armenian society; the low level of coercive power available to them. The Armenian trade communities had various relationships with their host societies but they never controlled them and the communities never militarized beyond the needs of personal self-defence. Protection was arranged by payment or by patronage of powerful rulers.​[172]​ Their dependence on foreign potentates, especially the shah of the Safavid Empire made negotiating a necessary element of their survival. The Armenians had to act carefully, to avoid ruling out any proposals or promises of agreement or association, but they also had to avoid exclusive alliances because this could mean the loss of the valuable support they had around the world. Information about opportunities, risks and de opportunities and risks of rival networks were very important information in this process. At the moment the Armenians had been able to arrange privileges, the information network was again very important because the news had to be spread again, so the whole network was able to act on the arrangements.​[173]​ 
The Armenian strategies
The European seaborne trade that developed in the 17th century was not able to overrule the already existing overland trading routes. The Armenian trading network even flourished at the same period the seaborne trade of the Europeans started to flourish. The question is what the Armenian success consisted of. What made the Armenian trading network viable even in the face of the massive trading companies? There is no single answer to this question; it is the combination of several factors that made the Armenian network a success. The prior discussed elements in this chapter will now be put together to create a coherent Armenian business strategy. 
	The first element is the duration of the Armenian participation in the overland trade between Asia and Europe. Years, centuries of practice make perfect and therefore the Armenians had been able to master the art of trading and all additional skills required for trading. Off course, the Armenian way of trading was not the perfect way of doing business. If that was the case, they would still dominate the overland trade on the Eurasian continent. But in their own time, the 17th century, they were capable masters of the art of trading and this made them formidable competitors who were not easily overthrown by the new organization of the trade the Dutch brought to their region; overseas trade. 
The history of the Armenian trading network changed dramatically in 1605 with the decree of the Safavid shah. The deportation of the Armenian merchants to New Julfa placed the merchants under the patronage of the shah. The Armenians started to act as creditors for the shah and became the carriers for the commodities the Safavid court received as tribute and taxes. In exchange, the shah employed the Armenians for envoys to foreign countries, because of their cosmopolitanism. A more direct effect of the patronage was protection of the trade the Armenians conducted.​[174]​ So, patronage was the second element of the Armenian success. 
The deportation turned the shattered Armenian trading network even more into a diaspora because the centre of the network, New Julfa was now located in a host society, the Safavid empire. Without any form of state support, the centre of the network was after all located in a foreign empire; the Armenian trading network depended on an active policy of diplomacy, because they had very little possibilities for coercive power. This policy of diplomacy consisted of carefully examining options for agreements without closing doors to other proposals while avoiding exclusive alliances.  Another result of their lack of state support was the cultural cohesion of the Armenian network. The network knew tight bonds of solidarity and trust based on the shared national feeling and a shared religion. 

There were also business strategies that are not specific Armenian but which contributed to the success of their trading network. One of them is the organization of the trading business into family firms. For Armenians, the family was a social but also an economic phenomenon. Business interests became family matters and in doing business with family members who were sent abroad, these shared interests served as insurance for opportunism. The family firm also employed unrelated agents, who committed to a partnership with the firm by means of a contract that resembled the commenda and in combination with the Astrakhan Code of Laws the relationship between the hired agent and the merchant was regulated at several levels, to ensure the agent would act honestly. For monitoring agents –and family members – abroad, correspondence between the communities, families and agents was used. The Armenians had a well developed courier system that also functioned as the glue of the network because it maintained the relations among the members of the network. Family matters, political news from around the world, business news and gossip were all elements of the correspondence. In this way, the tight bonds of trust and solidarity could be sustained and the agents abroad could be monitored. 




After the examination of the cases, it is now possible to analyze the cases in the comparative way, described in the first chapter. The factors are derived from the analyses of both cases in the previous chapters and will be explained and labeled in the first part of this chapter. After establishing and labeling the factors, the Boolean expressions can be derived and based on these expressions; it is possible to determine the success factors for organizing cross cultural trade. 
Labelling the factors
After examining the networks, it is time to return to the Boolean matrix. In the chapter about the comparative method, the role of the analysis of factors is already explained. In this conclusion, the networks will be examined again, but now in the light of the factors that are characteristic for the Dutch and/or the Armenians. The factors will first be introduced and then applied to the networks so it can be determined which number should be allocated to the factor in each case. The next step derives the determining factor(s) that created the outcome, which is a successful 17th century trading network. 
In the chapter about the VOC, it was made clear that violence was an essential part of their trading strategies in Southeast Asia. The military revolution turned the Europeans into several superior military powers and this gave them advantages when they sailed abroad. It was relatively ease to impress the Asian population and force them into cooperate or even work for the VOC. The local rulers had military power but this paled in the face of the Dutch military might. Protection against this might was impossible and there was nothing left to do than to co-operate. And this military superiority gave the Dutch lots of advantages in the conduct of their trade. The spice monopoly was enforced by means of violence and the Chinese had faced the Dutch violence, when the VOC did not see its wishes honoured. In the Chinese case, the Dutch also made use of diplomacy but this was mainly based on the threat of violence. So, therefore the factor violence is present in the Dutch network. The factor diplomacy is only sometimes present, because in the case of the cloves, diplomacy was never part of the policy. After the 1630s, the Dutch did however learn the skills of diplomacy in Asia and started to use it as a strategy to gain access to the inter-Asian trade. For the Spice Islands, there was a distinct company policy in which diplomacy never played a role. The diplomacy factor should therefore be labelled as present. When both factors are applied to the Armenian case, the first thing that comes to mind is the lack of coercive power the Armenians had. They never militarized beyond the need of self-defence. This factor can be labelled absent. The policy the Armenians had to rely on was diplomacy. In their relations with the various host societies they always relied on agreements, privileges and paying for protection, so the diplomacy factor should be labelled as present for the Armenians. 
The term monopoly has already been mentioned. A spice monopoly was the main objective for the Dutch to sail to the Southeast Asian waters and although this paper focused mainly on cloves, the Dutch managed to monopolize three other spices. The Dutch trade was, at least partially, organized in a monopolistic way, so therefore the factor monopoly can be labelled as present. Spices were a very important commodity for the Dutch. Large parts of the trading policy in Southeast Asia can be interpreted in the light of the spice desire. The focus on one commodity is also a present factor. Even the Armenians had some kind of a monopoly because they controlled the Safavid silk market. The imperial court had the official monopoly but the trade in silk was carried out by Armenians. In 1629, the monopoly was abolished and the Armenians were able to keep their control of the market and even the supplies because they were now able to obtain the silk directly from the producers. Their long experience enabled them to keep the silk trade in Armenian hands, even though it was not a monopoly in the true sense. 
The silk trade was not the only experience the Armenians had. Already in the 14th century, the Armenians were active in overland trade between Europe and Asia. After an imperial decree, they were deported to New Julfa and their old trading network was replaced by a new one, now operating from the Safavid Empire. The long experience of the Armenians had turned into extraordinary masters of the art of trading. 
In comparison, the VOC was established in 1602 and this made the VOC a young company. At the end of the 16th century, several expeditions to the Indian Ocean had already been made but still, the Indian Ocean experience of the VOC was very limited, so this is an absent factor. 
The charter also provided the VOC with the very extensive powers. The VOC could make war and peace and could also sign treaties as if it was a sovereign power. Trade and politics became also very interrelated on Amboina were the Dutch occupied the Portuguese fortress and started to use it as their base for political control of the Amboina region. The inhabitants became Dutch subject and the VOC turned from merchant into king. In the China Sea, the VOC established itself as the dominant maritime power but without any territory. This limited their freedom of changing the existing trading patterns. Again, force was used to change this by trying to force the Chinese into agreements of free trade. The sovereign rights gave the VOC authority that was used to obtain the trading privileges the VOC desired. The ability to wage war was used to gain the desired spice monopolies and also to gain access to the Chinese markets, even though this failed. In the heydays of their commercial successes the Armenians lived in the Safavid Empire, which was a host society and not the Armenian homeland. The other Armenian communities were also located in host societies. They all depended on the protection of foreign rulers and this was most important for the centre of the network; New Julfa. The Safavid shah had granted the Armenians in his capital several privileges and franchises, in exchange for Armenian credit and their skills in carrying out the imperial silk monopoly. In some sense this gave the Armenians some political power. With capital and their excellent merchant skills as collateral, they were better able to keep their privileges. The political power is however, very indirect and this is better labelled as diplomacy than as political power. Real political power was not the objective of the Armenian trading network, trading was their main business. Armenian political power seems to be absent. 
The last factor that has to be labelled is flexibility. The Armenian network has been described as a combination of numerous small partnerships, either with family members or unrelated Armenian agents. This made the Armenian network a very flexible one. The focus was on many regions and on many commodities and in case of declining demand for a product, it was easy to switch to other commodities, other regions and other markets. There was no focus for one specific commodity, like the Dutch spice rush. Agents were trusted and this enabled them to act to their own intuition, as long as it did not collide with the family/business interests. Different agents were also able to try different strategies. Losses in one sector could easily be compensated with profits from other branches of the firm. Trust and the shared values are the reasons for this flexibility. The Dutch trade was organized in a corporate way with a central rule based in the Republic. Agents were sent out with a specific mission and were not allowed to act with their own ideas. The VOC was a more rigid organization that was also more costly than the Armenian network organization. The focus was mainly on the spices and this was in the beginning of the 17th century a very costly operation, which was only compensated with the enormous profits on the Dutch market. The internalization of the protection costs into the company reduced the chances for adapting to the specific circumstances. 
The Boolean matrix













The Boolean analysis 
The outcome that is examined is the success of trading networks and both cases are successful 17th century trading networks. The next step is to determine which of the factors is decisive for success of the trading networks. The matrix is now used to write the equation, the success formula: S= CDefMPV + cDEFMpv. This seems very complex and therefore minimization is the following step in order to find the decisive factors for a successful trading network. In this step, the factors which are different in the success formula will be removed because it is not likely that these will influence the outcome. The new formula is very simple: S= DM and this brings about a very simple conclusion; the successes of the 17th century trading networks are based on the use of diplomacy for the position of the network in combination with maintaining an obtained monopoly. 




The results from the previous chapter showed that the successes of the 17th century trading networks are based on the use of diplomacy for the position of the network in combination with maintaining an obtained monopoly. 
	In practice, trading networks with a monopoly one or even more commodities were able to establish themselves as strong merchants. Even though it was not always successful, the Dutch were able to control the spice flow to the European markets and the Armenians were the sole carriers of the Persian silk. Maintaining a monopoly is an expensive business but the Dutch and Armenian monopolies were also very profitable. So, the production and markets for other commodities were also tried to be controlled as much as possible. Even though it was impossible to monopolize every commodity, attempts to eliminate rivals were numerous. Eliminating rivals can be done in many ways but diplomatic ways were the most successful. From the moment the Dutch realised the Asian culture consisted of several different communities in which different competing interests prevailed, the VOC was able to use this competition to enter the those communities to control the trade from within.​[178]​ For Armenians, the use of diplomacy was a vital element of their network. The dependence on host societies for privileges made them excellent negotiators because they never established self-governing communities, except for the centre of the network in New Julfa. The communities outside New Julfa all maintained friendly relations with their host societies, although governments sometimes showed a dislike. In most societies, the Armenians were residing long enough to be seen as subjects of the local government. This gave them a stronger position in the negotiations, because they were no longer seen as foreigners.​[179]​ 
	The monopoly and the diplomacy seem to be two different strategies that complement each other. When this is seen in the light of the Boolean expression, it can be said that the combination of different strategies is the explanation for the successes of the trading networks. The application of different strategies and even overlapping of strategies has already been described as successful. The Dutch attempts to eliminate rivals from the Southeast Asian waters led them to fight Chinese competitors and the step to gaining control of the Chinese trade was very easy.​[180]​ The use of force was a strategy here, but when the use of force is used to threaten the competition, it has become diplomatic tool. So, the success of 17th century trading networks is explained by the use of a combination of strategies, which are the possession and maintaining of a monopoly for one or more commodities and the use of diplomacy to gain access to the production and/or markets. And this is exactly what the Boolean analysis also revealed as the success formula for 17th century trading networks. 
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